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They're Laughing at Us in Moscow'

Report on ClA 124 How Herald Got Story ... 4E

By WILLIAM MONTALBANO Herald Staff Writer Copyright The Miami Herald Publishing Co. 1975

WASHINGTON - One of America's brightest young sples, an earn's est, committed professional who says he ran clandestine operations.

on four continents in the last decade, has resigned in disgust from the CIA.

"The CIA is paralyzed," he charges. "They are laughing at us in Moscow and Havana. Even cur friends don't, trust, us anymore, i quit because I could not longer do my joh."

The spy is Mike Ackerman, a 34-year-old Miamian who writes com-

mentaries on classical dudatan in his spare time and is impore girald of the Soviet Union than anything else on earth."

Her hir ges that the CIA has been indermined by its own mistakes, by adventurist politicians, by a lack of cooperation on the part of other government agencies; by elements, of the Apperican press (that have sacrificed aptional interest for sensationalism and by sair American public in Herent to the needs of professional intelligence services. It would be a simple as that."

For four years, Ackerman, says, the fraveled widely — mostly in Latin A-wrica — as a lone-well say.

forces. He was among the youngest officers in the CIA to hole such a rank, according to an agency spokesman who confirmed his employment and resignation.

TACKERMAN has not gone public to tell stories out of school. He says he will not violate confidences, this goal is to make himself credible and to make credible his contention that a vital safeguard of U.S. scority is being destroyed by 1 he calls "a hostile political clin...s in the United States."

Ackerman says the CIA has lost its effectiveness.

"If I were a Russian today and

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TOM PAGE I

alk to somebody I would go (British intelligence) or sad (Israeli intelligence.) uld not have been true a s ago."

frustration. Ackerman bespeaks not only for himalso for other professional acc officers of his generase personal circumstances flow them to speak publicels that they are paying for made by another generatelligence officers. w.

trade, Ackerman was a "street man," slang for all number of front-line of think on their feet, usualzione and are at home in -alley world where intellirought and soid.

LL acknowledge by name wo countries where he The Dominican Republic His service there bassy cover is recorded in nt documents available to

an argues that intellian indispessible tool of n's foreign policy. In the al counterweight to underprations regularly under-Communist countries.

nds covert action, the tarmich of the recent outcry ne CIA, as a legitimate of an intelligence agency action is in the national

CIA can no longer effec-Ty out either clandestine e-gathering or covert po-

led to quit the day I met with a Communist source risking his life to see mezed I could not guarantee.

was no way I could prom-that some irresponsible Congress or ex-employee leak his information or reporter wouldn't blat it a front page.

IS the recent record. And itional tragedy.'

A must be allowed to ain secure boundaries.


seems general agreement untry that we shouldn't ic the details of the Polaguidance system. Why is also a consensus about on of our principal intelmay? Without secrecy, a service cannot func-

May, from his post at a sav in Europe, Ackerman AA director of personnel e only job he has had ng college.

y resign from A effec-, but do not belie can fulfill that nussion costile political climate rently prevails in our have reached the regrettision that I can do more

"The cynics will, no doubt, conclude that this is a CIA operation. It isn't. It's my operation. And anybody who listens to what I have to say will quickly discover there is nobody in the world who would sponsor bull-headed Mike Ackerman but me."

--- Ackeeman



In a lengthy series of interviews he emerged as hawkish, articulate, intelligent, somewhat rigid and entirely right:ousein his convictions... He is both tense and intense.

He is the son of an immigrant Russian Jew from Besarabia and he is profoundly feligious. Once, in order not to break cover, he posed as an Italian Jew to worship at a Latin American synagogue. Ackerman's mother riow widowed keeps man's mother, now widowed, keeps a kosher home in North Dade.

Ackerman was born in New York. He is a graduate of Dartmouth (magna cum laude) and earned a master's degree in political science at Columbia University before joining the CIA. (His mas-ter's thesis compared the Autenticos in Cuba with the Populares in Puerto Rico.)

After more than a decade of life in the shadows, Ackerman is now uneasy, squinting a bit in anticipa-tion of the sunlight. It is his intef-lect, the wits by which he has lived as a spy, that he is relying on to see him through what he expects may be a difficult transition.

HIS PLANS are uncertain. He has about \$10,000 in pension money recovered from the government and some \$4,000 paid for unused leave time. Initially, at least, he will seek public forums.

Ackerman anticipates a credibility problem.

"The cynics will, no doubt, conclude that this is a CIA operation. It isn't. It's my operation. And anybody who listens to what I have to say will quickly discover there is nobody in the world who would sponsor bull-headed Mike Ackerman

As avocations, Ackerman plays the stock market and writes about theology: last winter he had a story published under a pseudonym in The Jewish Spectator.

Ackerman does not smoke, and he drinks little, although he is an expert handicapper of Miami sin-gles' bars. In one of them, he was once overwhelmed for the attentions of a girl by a competitor who told lurid stories of his career as a

HE WAS BORN Emanuel C. Ackerman, but chose Mike as a prefer-red first name when he joined the

aunts and uncles know him a Emanuel.

Ackerman's entire CIA career was spent in the Clandestine Services, which is known officially as the Deputy Directorate of Opera-tions and is sometimes referred to by the media as the "Dirty Tricks-Department."

The CS, as Ackerman calls it, runs covert operations and seeks intelligence from human sources. It is the most elite, the most secre and one of the smallest divisions of the CIA, most of the work of which deals with intelligence analysis deals with interagence such as Unegenes poor as a front manufactor sources such as European fishing industry tycoc of electronic and photographic espionage.

"Bear" vas the nickname tagged on Ackerpan by hisrcolleagues.

try, I suppose, and because I tend to be sloppy and clumsy." A colleague, once writing a physical description of Ackerman, noted play-fully: "app to have ketchip stains on his tie and sleeves after lunch and dinner.*

KINNEG HIS We straight is not one of those things that most concerts Ackermin.

"The great-st American intelligence officer who ever lived was a great, messy, shambling man who looked like Jackie Gleason with a mustache."

The CIA spokesman who acknowledged 'Ackerman's service said he had left the service "in the highest repute." service 6

"He was an extremely wellthought-of operations officer with an excellent record," the spokes-man said. "He was one of the youngest of his rank we've got here It is unusual for an officer of his age to be so far ahead of the

A high CIA executive, who has been publicly identified as such but prefers to remain anonymous in this instance, evaluated Ackerman

this way:
"He gets extremely high marks
for intellect and imagination and high marks for dedication. I rank him in the top 3 per cent among his peers in performance and in the top 10 per cent over-ail."

Another CIA executive, now re-tired after 30 years in intelligence, Wis Miami station chief when Ackerman was based there.

"Askerman was one of the most of the loners I ever had." the re-

pervisors, now working in Latin, America, said flatly:

"He is the best C.O. (case officer) I have ever met.

For the first part of his weer, For the first part of his arear, Ackerman says, he was a socialist in covert action operation. He help a depression of the communistical stakes, he funneled funds to the publisher of a moderate newspaper under attack; he helped a democratical actions ward off a communistical actions ward of the communistical party.

Ackerman says his trademark was to work as a non-American Once he posed as a hard-driving penetrate a hostile embassy. Abother time he pretended to be a suban Trotskyite to make contact with an African radical movement.

"My specialty was the ast pitch: to meet a source, try to establish a relationship and then puch him. I am arrepresentative of U.S. intelli-gence and I think there are compelling reasons why you should cooperate with us.

"Sometimes you strike out. But if you bat 1,000 them you're pitching gid mines becales THE LANGE

THE HIGHEST honor I ever re-The Highest nonor reverte-cent from my colleagues was the resented a shell game for my builday.

ckerman believes in classical in-telligence the way Bobby Fisher, be-lieves in chess. For Ackerman, behighest accolade is to be "profes-sional." Bring a spy, he says, is to practice a profession as honorable as it is old

"When Moses needed spies to go into Canaarshe didn't pick just anybody. He close 12 princes, including Joshua."

Intelligence says Ackerman, is a cerebral game that demands more patience than glamor, more intellect than brawn. The popular image of a spy is so far from the real thing, he says, that real spies don't even read spy stories.

"I seldom carried a gun. The only training in firearms or unarmed combat I ever got was routine in-struction in the Air Force.

"I never shor anybody, and I have never been shot at. Once I had to throw a block on a cop in Latin America, but there was because I made a Tistake. When you have to do that, its usually too late.

"I have never been hassled, never been arrested, never caused a scanunity and in support of red first name when he joined the experience it is a private citiz. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/20: CIA-RDP79M00467A000200120026-9 blown and

FROM THE NEWSROOM

By LARRY JINES Herald Executive Sanot

Two months ago Bill Montalbano introduced me to Mike Ackerman at a restaurant on Biscayne Bay. We were there because Ackerman

flatly refused to come to The Herald.

4.

There: was nog way he would enter a newspaper: office, he said. At that time, he was: still on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency.



JINKS

He appeared to be ill at ease, but he was sure of what he wanted to say: He had decided to quit the Central Intelligence Agency because he felt he could no longer do the job he was paid to do. And, he wanted to tell his story.

That's where Montalbano and I came in.

He and Ackerman had known each other when both were graduate students at Columbia in the early 1960's. They had talked once several years ago after Ackerman, whose mother lives here, had seen Montalbano's byline in The Herald.

GENERALLY WARY of the press, he trusted Bill - more or less. Generally wary of intelligence agents, Bill trusted Ackerman more or less.

Ackerman had told Montalbano what he wanted to do. Montalbano expressed interest; and suggested the meeting with me.

If he quit, Ackerman asked us, was The Herald interested in printing his story?

Well, we were interested in talking about it - but we had reservations. What did he want to say? How could we be sure he was what he said he was? For that matter, how could we satisfy ourselves that his resignation and public statements were not themselves a CIA operation?

AS WE TALKED he spoke angrily about CIA critics, including the press. He referred to Philip Agee, the turncoat agent who wrote a tell-all book about the agency, as a traitor. He argued passionately for the need of a sophisticated intelli-gence operation, including a capacity for covert operations, in today's

But he was almost as vigorous in criticizing some of the agency's activities. He thought many of the OSS generation of CIA leaders had been guilty of bad judgment and with special contempt - a lack of professionalism. He expressed concern that the principles he had been taught as a young agent had been flouted by some of those who did the teaching.

We made it clear we were only interested in his story if it included a fair balance of his opinions, pro and con, and if he offered enough facts about his career to help our readers understand better how the agency operates.

HE WAS WILLING, with the clear stipulation that he would not violate his oath to the agency.

Since he was not a professional writer he was willing, too, to work. with Montalbano in preparing his articles.

It was not too difficult to verify that Ackerman was who he said he was.. We started with Montalbano's personal knowledge, and made full use of the kinds of contacts a news organization develops with even a supersecret government agency.

Tougher to deal with was the question of whether the resignation was a pretense, part of a planned defense of a CIA under assault. After all, we were dealing with a man who by his own account had been a skilled con man as a case of-

ULTIMATELY, deciding that the resignation was for real was a matter of judgment - judgment based on logic, on investigation, on personal contact.

Neither Ackerman's name nor his position gives his words automatic weight. Many of his opinions are controversial, including his view of CIA history.

If the resignation were a ruse, its public nature would forever limit his ability to go back to doing what he did. His action is consistent with his pecanacity and his longtumes. convictions. The facts we can check all hold together.

· HIS STORY, told with Montalbano's help, begins in today's Herald. It offers a different perspective on the CIA, a deeply concerned insider's view.

At a time when the agency's future is being debated, we think it is a view worth presenting to our readers.

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uted to our political institutions and not to William Colby.

HE DID HIS BEST in what was HE DID HIS BEST in what was an impossible situation. He made significant strides in restoring public confidence in the CIA and in the process achieved for himself a degree of credibility with Congress, the press and the public at large which is quite remarkable for a CIA director. In the current national mond.

At the same time Colby was zeal-At the same time Colby was zoalous in defending the need to protect the zeercey of intelligence sources and techniques. If some information of this nature has been leaked by congressional investigating committees, he cannot be held responsible. Colby was less zealous in protecting information on the genesis of CIA covert action operations which could be embarrassing to administration officials, and particularly Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. I hope that this stance was not a factor in his dismissal.

Colby's public role is well-known.

Colhy's public role is well-known and well-documented. What is not and well-documented. What is not so widely understood is the role he played within the CiA. He has had great impact there, and I hope that impact will be a lasting one. Colby is a straight arrow. Whatever faults he may have, dishanesty and hypogrisy are not among them. He was exactly the right man to undertake an internal investigation and reform of the CiA.

Let there be no mistaking that it was Colby, and his immediate pre-

decessor as CIA Director, James 'the external investigations began, Schlesinger (who was, ironically, fired as delense secretary along with Colby.) who first underfock extensive Internal investigation of CIA improprieties, including Blegal domestic forays and assassination plotting. Schlesinger and Colby were the ones who called upon any CIA couployes who knew of improprieties to come forward and report, them, and they did it long before



George Bush:

They were the ones who ordered questionable practices ended and who instituted internal procedures to ensure against repetition of the misdeeds. They were the ones who, institutionalized the new post-Watergate morality within the CIA.

tergate morality within the CIA.

THE SENATE and House Select Committees on Intelligence, for all their noise and indignation, for all their noise and indignation, for all their noise and indignation for all their morality and revelations, have not themselves uncovered or caded any improprieties. They have merely publicated the misdeeds uncovered and corrected by Schlesinger and Colby, Prisident Ford cited once again the viai role that the CIA plays in America's defense. But the fact remains that the timing of his action was disastrous for the CIA. It condenns the agency to face the crucial months in which the congressional investigations with he completed and reform legislation introduced and debated with less than effective lendership.

For an indefinite period Colby will remain to face Congress, the public and his own agency as a lame-duck acting director in whom the President no longer has confidence. It is a measure of the man that he has agreed, after his tinceremonious dismissal, to stay bit and do his best.

do his best.

And then the directorship will, pass to a new man, George Bush, a political figure, whose intelligence background is nil. It will be many months before Bush will be able to testify before Congress with the au-

thority of William Colby, I doubt that he will ever achieve Colby's credibility. He is, after all, not above the political fray, as Colby is, but of it and in it.


The investigation of the CIA has long been too political. It was first politicized by the Senate Democratic leadership, which appointed to the chairmanship of its select committee Senator Frank Church, a presidential aspirant. Senator Church himself further politicized the investigation by his sensational public summarice of testimony offered at closed hearings and, subsequently, by his sponsorship of bpen hearings.

Now President Ford has respond-

Now President Ford has responded in kind by his appointment of Bush, a former Republican national chairman, By this appointment the President has unquestionably turned the CIA Into an Issue for the 1976 presidential campaign.

TIIIS CAN ONLY burt the CIA and the notion. There was a time in this country when the CIA was removed from politics. There was no partisan debate over the U-2 incident or even the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, in those days we seemed to be able to close ranks when it was in our national interest to do so. Our leaders seemed to be able to pid national security before partisan or personal interest. I believe that we were all the better for it.

I served in the CIA for two years during William Colby's director-ship, I met him only once, and that was before he became director, to



. As we make our approach to 1976, you may notice a little turbulence ...

brief him on a clandestine operation in which I was involved. I really didn't make his arquaintance as an individual. I knew him best through his public appearances. He impressed me in those appearances as a loyal CIA man and a dedicated American patriot. He has cone his best to remold the CIA internally and to defend it from its external critics. I believe that his principal concern has been to pro-

serve intact as much of the CI operating capability as he possi sion knowing that his days as ditor were numbered and that, as so dien the case in the CIA, his wards would be confined to a very satisfaction be coold prime by derive from the quality of service. I hope that today his sa faction is profound.

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SECTION L The Miami Merald Sunday, Nov. 9, 1975

m Favora

By MIKE ACKERMAN

There have been no bouquets and. only a few kind words for William Colby since'he was fired last week Colly since he was fired last week as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, President Ford, announcing his dismissal, noted only that Colly had ushered the CIA through a difficult period. This scant praise was the barest minimum which ordinary politeness would tolerate on such an occasion.

would tolerate on such an occasion.

Nor have others come forth to champion Coloy, It's not surprising. After all, for Congress he has long been the adversary, stolicily defending CIA against an avalanche of accusations, some justified and some patently inaccurate. For those elements of the press which have made the destruction of the CIA their cause, he has been the enemy: the career intelligence officer, the professional conspirator, the amoral civil servant, the hit man in a business suit.

I THINK THAT history will judge William Colby much more kindly. He has performed to the best of his ability in what has been the most thankless of jobs, and he has had his moments. He has at

times been surprisingly effective as CIA's defender, in part because he has achieved what is for a man of has achieved what is for a man of his background and position a remarkable degree of credibility. Within the ClA itself, he has been an effective reformer. It is Cothy more than anyone else who has sought out past ClA misdeedls, end-dunwise practices, and set a new tone for the agency. a lone very much in line with post-Watergate American morality.

Colby served as the director of the ClA for two and a half difficult years. When he took over the agency in May in 1973, it was already under investigation by minority members of the Senate Watergate.

Mike Ackerman resigned from the CIA last May after II years us a claudestine agent. He expluined the reasons for his resignation in a series which was published exclusively in Tha Miant Herold. He now lives

Committee, determined to prove that the CIA had played a direct role in organizing the break-in. It was not long after the crucial White House tape finally established that the agency had been a ; victim of Vatergate and not a co-conspirator, that a new and strong-er tide of Journalistic, congressional and public criticism of the CIA was unleashed.

It fell to Coiby to explain and to defend the application of the CIA was

It fell to Colby to explain and to defend the embittled Agency. He could not be other than sacrificial; it has jong been apparent that Colby's tenure as CIA director would not be a leng one. The Rockefeller Commission all but dismissed him with its recommendation that future CIA directors be sought from outside the career service of the agency.

COLBY WAS controversial even within the CIA fixelf. There were many within the clandestine service, especially at the more senior devels, who detested him. They were the feld-style intelligence officers, from Celby's own generation, who believed that the agency's beginning the criticism would be to stonewall.

it. He was decidedly more popular with the younger generation of CIA officers.

I was myself dublous about Colby for a long time. At the begin-ning of his directorship he seemed to me to be all too public. He let his hair down about intelligence techniques at off-the-record press briefings, and was stung when his background information appeared. In print.

But he learned from his militakes.

ground information appeared in print.

But he learned from his mistakes. As criticism of the CIA intensified he became increasifully effective as its defender. It is about to believe that the CIA could have, stone-walled it. It had, through its own misdereds, opened fiself to public criticism and suspicion; it was incumbent upon the agency to clear its name and its record.

It would have been best for the CIA and the nation if the egency had been given to the opportunity to clear its name at congressingly hearings conducted behind closed doors and summarized in a final public report. But if hearings were not conducted in this responsible manner, the failure must be attribution.

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